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Urban Costs and the Spatial Structure of 
Cities: A Laboratory Experiment1 
	Michiel	Bliemer2,	Laurent	Denant-Boemont3,	Sabrina	Hammiche3,	David	Hensher2	and	Corinne	Mulley2	June,	2016		
Abstract	This	paper	presents	a	laboratory	experiment	to	investigate	how	urban	costs	might	determine	the	internal	structure	 of	 urban	 areas	 (monocentric	 or	 polycentric)	 by	 influencing	 location	 choices	 of	 firms	 and	households.	The	experimental	design	is	in	part	guided	by	a	theoretical	model	that	shows	how	the	trade-off	between	communication	costs	faced	by	firms	and	commuting	costs	borne	by	workers	determine	the	degree	of	 cities’	 polycentricism	 by	 influencing	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 workplaces	 within	 it.	 In	 the	 laboratory	experiment,	groups	of	16	subjects	participated	in	a	two-step	auction	game,	where	firms	and	workers	first	negotiated	to	find	a	job	contract	and	second	where	workers	bid	for	land	in	order	to	find	a	home.	The	game	is	repeated	for	four	rounds	and	different	experimental	treatments	are	implemented,	each	defining	a	given	scenario	 for	 communication	 costs	 and	 commuting	 costs.	 The	 chosen	 benchmark	 is	 a	 polycentric	 city	treatment,	where	no	communication	cost	exists	for	firms,	giving	them	no	incentive	to	locate	in	the	CBD.	In	two	other	treatments,	the	communication	cost	is	positive.	In	the	Monocentric	City	treatment,	commuting	cost	for	workers	is	low,	giving	a	clear	incentive	for	firms	to	locate	in	the	CBD,	as	workers	do	not	suffer	from	potential	 high	 commuting	 costs,	 giving	 an	 outcome	 where	 all	 firms	 should	 locate	 in	 the	 CBD.	 In	 the	Hierarchical	City	treatment,	the	commuting	cost	is	very	high	for	workers,	giving	workers	a	strong	incentive	to	live	close	to	their	workplace	and	accepting	lower	wages	as	a	result.	Experimental	results	are	in	line	with	theoretical	predictions:	firms	tend	to	locate	in	the	CBD	under	the	monocentric	treatment,	whereas	more	distant	locations	are	accepted	leading	to	a	hierarchical	outcome	as	workers	propose	lower	wages	for	not	working	in	the	CBD	so	as	to	escape	high	commuting	costs.		Keywords:	Polycentric	City,	commuting	costs,	location	choices,	job	contracts.	
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1. Introduction In	many	developing	countries,	urban	housing	and	commuting	costs	represent	a	significant	share	 of	 household	 income.	 For	 European	 countries	 for	 instance,	 Winqvist	 (1999)	estimates	this	amount	to	be	more	than	40%	of	income,	and	estimates	are	even	larger	for	the	USA.	Haas	et	al.	(2006)	estimate	that	48%	of	household	income	for	28	US	metropolitan	areas	 is	 spent	 on	 housing	 and	 commuting,	 and	 even	more	 (around	58%)	 for	working	families	with	income	between	$20,000	and	$50,000.		Most	important,	the	share	of	such	costs	in	income	is	increasing	each	year.	In	the	case	of	Australia,	Burns	(2008)	indicates	that	borrowers	now	require	38%	of	their	family	income	to	cover	mortgage	repayments	with	those	in	the	rental	market	surrendering	24.7%	of	their	incomes	to	rent.	Focusing	on	the	 Australian	 case,	 commuting	 costs 4 	could	 represent	 around	 6,000	 AU$	 for	Sydneysiders	per	year	and	more	than	5,000$	for	Melbourne	citizens	(Flood	and	Barbato,	2005),	and	therefore	urban	cost	 for	 inhabitants	of	urban	areas	could	weigh	more	than	50%	of	their	income.	These	 urban	 costs	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 location	 choices	 by	households,	as	early	demonstrated	by	Alonso	(1964)’s	seminal	article	with	households	trading	commuting	costs	 to	 land	costs	 in	order	 to	determine	 their	 location	place.	This	framework	was	used	to	describe	the	monocentric	city,	i.e.	a	city	where	all	jobs	and	firms	are	exogenously	located	in	the	CBD.	Nevertheless,	as	shown	by	Anas	et	al.	(1998),	urban	structure	has	over	many	decades	exhibited	major	qualitative	changes	in	growth	patterns.	Cities	continue	to	spread	out,	this	being	perfectly	in	line	with	Alonso’s	theory	if	(intra-urban)	commuting	cost	decreases.	But	it	is	intrinsically	not	possible	with	Alonso’s	model	to	 explain	 why	 in	 some	 cities	 this	 spreading	 out	 in	 urban	 structure	 is	 taking	 a	more	polycentric	form,	with	a	number	of	concentrated	employment	centres	making	their	mark	on	 the	 spatial	 distribution	 of	 both	 employment	 and	 population.	 More	 generally,	 as	demonstrated	theoretically	in	Fujita	and	Ogawa	(1982),	the	urban	spatial	structure	of	a	city	 is	the	outcome	of	the	economic	interactions	between	firms	and	households,	which	 favours	 spatial	 concentration	 because	 of	 agglomeration	 economies.	 This	conclusion	also	holds	in	the	case	of	the	theoretical	model	developed	by	Lucas	and	Rossi-Hansberg	(2002),	where	the	intensity	of	production	externality	and	the	level	of	commuting	costs	for	workers	explain	the	zoning	structure	of	the	city.	Depending	on	 the	 degree	 of	 concentration	 or	 dispersion	 of	 firms,	 these	 agglomeration	economies	vary	among	intra-metropolitan	locations.	Some	of	these	locations	might	become	main	employment	centres,	whereas	others	remain	as	non-central.	High	urban	costs	create	incentives	for	firms	to	leave	the	main	urban	employment	centres	(Lucas	 and	 Rossi-Hansberg,	 2002),	 despite	 the	 numerous	 advantages	 arising	 from		
4	It	is	nothing	to	say	that	these	commuting	costs	are	measured	as	monetary	costs,	and	do	not	include	time	costs	that	could	be	significantly	above	it.	
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agglomeration	(Duranton	&	Puga,	2005;	Hensher	et	al.,	2012).	In	so	doing,	firms	are	able	to	pay	lower	wages	and	land	rents	while	remaining	within	a	metropolitan	area.	That	is,	the	formation	of	subcenters	within	a	city	seems	to	be	a	natural	response	for	alleviating	the	burden	of	urban	costs.	Nevertheless,	as	pointed	by	Anas	et	al.	(1998),	these	growing	subcenters	 do	 not	 eliminate	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 main	 CBD,	 since	 higher-order	metropolitan	functions	(executives,	engineers,	research,	banking	and	insurance,	etc.)	tend	to	remain	in	the	main	employment	centre.	This	concentration	of	facilities,	that	remains	essential	for	firms	in	order	to	produce,	implies	communication	costs	for	firms	that	are	to	locate	outside	the	main	employment	centre,	even	 if	 there	 is	a	clear	empirical	evidence	about	the	decrease	of	these	costs	(Glaeser	and	Ponzetto,	2010).	The	 aim	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 study	 how	 the	 observed	 urban	 spatial	 structure	 could	 be	produced	by	the	interaction	between	firms	and	households	facing	different	urban	costs.	More	 specifically,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 transport	 costs	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 city	structure	 through	 a	 laboratory	 experiment.	 The	 relationship	 between	 transport/trade	costs	and	location	choices	is	one	of	the	key	questions	that	exist	in	two	economic	related	literatures,	the	first	being	Urban	Economics	-	starting	with	the	seminal	work	of	Alonso	(1964)	-	and	second,	more	recently,	the	New	Economic	Geography	(NEG),	following	the	paper	of	Krugman	(1995)	(see	also	Krugman,	1998).	Most	papers	in	the	urban	economics	literature	have	focused	on	the	Monocentric	City,	assuming	that	all	jobs	are	located	in	the	Central	Business	District	(CBD),	building	theoretical	models	to	‘explain’	location	choices	for	households	given	the	relationship	to	transport	costs	(for	a	review,	see	Fujita,	1989).	Very	few	papers	are	about	 location	choices	both	for	firms	and	households,	workplaces	being	 possibly	 everywhere	 in	 the	 urban	 area,	 which	 is	 the	 main	 characteristic	 of	 a	Polycentric	Urban	Spatial	Structure5.		Empirical	 relevance	 regarding	 New	 Economic	 Geography	 Model	 or	 Urban	 Economics	models	is	wide,	but	restricted	essentially	to	field	data	studies	(see	Combes	et	al,	2008).	While	 empirical	 evidence	 cannot	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 clear	 test	 of	 any	 of	 these	 theoretical	models,	economic	experiments	that	relate	to	location	choices	are	rare.	The	main	part	of	the	 experimental	 literature	 has	 focused	 on	 firm’s	 location	 choice	 in	 a	 Hotelling-like	environment:	 Firms	 compete	 for	 a	 location	 slot,	 consumers	 already	being	 located	 and	uniformly	distributed	among	space,	supporting	transport	costs	in	order	to	consume,	with	price	being	exogenously	fixed	by	the	experimenter	(See	Brown-Kruse	et	al.,	1993;	Brown-Kruse	&	Shenk,	2000;	Collins	&	Sherstyuk,	2000;	Huck	et	al.,	2004;	Anderson	et	al.,	2007).	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 only	 experimental	work,	which	 considers	households’	 location	choice	in	a	monocentric	model,	where	all	firms	are	exogenously	located	in	the	CBD,	is	the	one	by	Bergman	 et	 al	 (2009).	 Their	 classroom	game	 aims	 at	 testing	Alonso’s	 bid	 rent	theory,	 in	particular	that	land	rent	should	decrease	with	distance	to	the	CBD	where	all		
5		At	the	theoretical	level,	and	to	our	knowledge,	the	only	articles	that	investigate	how	transport	costs	could	influence	location	choices	by	firms	and	households	as	workers	are	Fujita	&	Ogawa	(1982)	and	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2007).	
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jobs	(firms)	are	located	and	the	resulting	experimental	bid	rent	functions	matched	quite	well	the	theoretical	predictions.	Ostbye	 and	Heen	 (2010)	 have	 implemented	 an	 experimental	 test	 of	 the	 Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman	competition	theory,	a	key	element	of	New	Economic	Geography	(NEG)	models,	where	both	 firms	and	 consumers	 are	 able	 to	 locate.	They	aim	at	 testing	 the	 empirical	relevancy	of	NEG	models.	But	 in	 fact,	 their	experimental	 study	 focuses	on	 the	 location	choices	 of	workers	 between	 two	 regions,	 assuming	 that	 the	 distribution	 of	 firms	will	follow	workers’	distribution	(which	is	a	usual	assumption	of	NEG	models,	as	pointed	out	by	Combes	et	al.,	2008).		The	 laboratory	 experiment	 presented	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 novel	 in	 two	 ways.	 To	 our	knowledge,	it	is	the	first	experiment	to	investigate	the	question	of	other	possible	spatial	structures	 than	 the	 usual	 monocentric	 one,	 in	 particular	 polycentric	 and	 hierarchical	structures	for	cities	by	enabling	firms	and	workers	to	determine	a	locational	equilibrium	that	is	observed	within	the	laboratory.	As	suggested	by	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2004),	the	emergence	of	polycentric	urban	structures	is	due	 at	 least	 to	 three	 reasons.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 increase	 in	 city	 population	 that	 leads	 to	suburbanization	and	to	the	decentralisation	of	jobs.	The	second	relates	to	the	increase	in	commuting	 costs6 ,	 and	 the	 third	 reason	 is	 a	 fall	 in	 firm’s	 communication	 costs.	 The	experiment	aims	to	show	how	the	balance	between	communication	costs	and	commuting	costs	matters	in	the	location	choice	of	all	agents	that	live	within	the	city,	and	how	changing	the	relative	values	of	these	different	costs	produces	different	urban	structures.			Focusing	on	the	urban	equilibrium	issued	from	a	trade-off	between	communication	costs	and	 commuting	 costs,	 our	 experimental	design	 inspires	upon	 the	 theoretical	model	 of	Cavailhes	 et	 al.	 (2007).	 	 In	 this	model,	 the	 internal	 structure	 of	 a	 city	 depends	 on	 the	relative	value	of	communication	costs	borne	by	firms	compared	to	commuting	costs	faced	by	workers,	workers	and	firms	having	to	choose	a	location	place.	In	their	model,	when	communication	costs	are	above	commuting	costs,	a	city	should	be	monocentric	(that	is,	all	 jobs	 being	 placed	 in	 the	 CBD)	 In	 contrast,	 when	 communication	 costs	 are	 below	commuting	costs,	there	is	a	polycentric	city	outcome	(that	is,	jobs	to	be	distributed	among	one	CBD	and	several	secondary	business	districts	(SBDs)).	As	commuting	cost	as	well	as	communication	cost	can	be	influenced	by	exogenous	public	policies,	hence	the	outcome	of	the	experiments	will	have	implications	for	public	policy	design.	More	specifically,	the	experiment	consists	in	conducting	a	Market	experiment	with	two	successive	steps,	the	first	one	being	a	double-auction	market	for	the	labour	market	where	workers	and	firms	interact,	and	the	second	a	sealed-bid	second-price	auction	where	only	workers	compete	for	land.	Three	experimental	treatments	are	defined,	depending	on	the	value	of	communication	costs	and	commuting	costs.	In	the	first	treatment,	defined	as	the		
6	For	instance,	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2004)	estimate	than	commuting	costs	(direct	monetary	cost)	in	the	Ile-de-France	region	increased	by	38%	between	1976	and	1991.	
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benchmark	in	this	paper	and	called	“polycentric	city”,	there	is	no	communication	costs	and	only	commuting	costs.	In	this	case,	the	equilibrium	corresponds	to	a	Pure	Polycentric	City,	CBD	surrounded	by	two	Secondary	Business	Districts	(SBDs),	each	workplace	being	of	equal	size.		Two	other	treatments	introduce	positive	communication	costs	for	firms	in	respect	of	the	essential	facilities	located	in	the	CBD,	which	in	the	experiment	are	specified	as	a	necessity	to	produce	output.	In	the	“Monocentric	City”	treatment,	communication	costs	are	higher	than	commuting	costs,	and	consequently,	the	locational	equilibrium	converges	to	a	single	CBD	 where	 all	 jobs	 (firms)	 are	 located	 and	 where	 no	 SBD	 can	 longer	 exist.	 The	 last	treatment,	 called	 “Hierarchical	 City”	 is	 characterized	 by	 a	 communication	 cost	 that	 is	lower	than	commuting	cost,	giving	incentives	for	firms	and	households	to	locate	outside	of	 the	CBD.	The	equilibrium	structure	corresponds	to	a	situation	where	a	main	CBD	is	surrounded	by	smaller	SBDs	of	the	same	size.		The	main	results	are	as	 follows.	 In	 the	polycentric	 treatment,	 the	distribution	of	 firms	tends	 to	 be	 uniform	 among	 possible	 locations	 places,	 as	 predicted	 by	 the	 theoretical	model.	Most	important,	comparing	a	monocentric	treatment	to	a	hierarchical	one,	a	clear	convergence	towards	the	monocentric	city	in	the	former	case	is	observed,	whereas	in	the	latter,	dispersion	 forces	 tend	 to	reduce	 the	size	of	CBD	with	smaller	workplaces	being	created	in	its	environs.	The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	outlines	the	theoretical	model	of	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2007),	as	it	informs	the	experimental	design.	Section	3	is	devoted	to	the	experimental	design,	 while	 section	 4	 presents	 experimental	 results.	 Section	 5	 presents	 a	 set	 of	conclusions.	
2. Theoretical model: Transport costs and The Urban 
structure of cities The	 theoretical	 model	 for	 building	 the	 experiment	 is	 inspired	 by	 Cavailhes,	 Gaigné,	Tabuchi	and	Thisse	(2007).	In	this	model,	they	derive	location	and	price	equilibriums	for	an	economy	with	two	regions,	endowed	with	mobile	firms	and	workers.	There	are	four	goods,	primary	goods	as	labour	and	land,	and	consumption	goods,	one	being	homogenous	as	a	numéraire	and	the	other	being	a	differentiated	good	produced	under	monopolistic	competition	and	increasing	returns,	using	labour	as	the	only	input.	Workers/consumers	display	a	preference	for	variety.	The	case	study	is	restricted	to	proposition	1	of	this	theoretical	model,	which	defines	single	city	 equilibrium	 and	 locations	 within	 it.	 Proposition	 1	 states	 that,	 depending	 on	communication	costs	 supported	by	 firms	 for	accessing	essential	 facilities	 compared	 to	commuting	costs	supported	by	workers	for	accessing	their	workplace,	the	structure	of	the	city	can	be	either	monocentric	or	polycentric.	More	precisely,	if	communication	costs	are	
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high	compared	to	commuting	costs,	the	city	structure	will	be	monocentric	(that	is	a	city	where	all	jobs	are	in	the	CBD)	and	otherwise	it	will	be	polycentric	(that	is,	jobs	will	be	split	over	one	CBD	and	several	SBDs).	Before	presenting	the	design	of	the	experiment,	the	main	elements	of	the	theoretical	model	are	summarised.		
2.1. Preferences of Agents and City Limit Points Workers	and	firms	are	free	to	locate	within	the	city,	but	essential	facilities	are	located	in	the	city	centre,	at	x=0.	These	facilities	are	necessary	for	firms	to	produce	and,	 if	a	firm	decides	 to	 locate	 in	a	different	place	 from	x=0,	 the	communication	cost	assumed	 for	a	given	firm	is		 𝜅(𝑥$) = 𝐾 + 𝑘𝑥$	 (1)	Where	xS	is	the	place	chosen	by	a	firm	to	locate,	i.e.	defining	a	workplace.	Since	there	are	l	workers	and	𝜃	being	the	share	of	workers	(or	firms)	located	in	the	CBD,	the	limit	points	for	the	city	are	the	following	(recall	that	will	be	described	here	only	the	right	side	of	the	city,	and	that	left	side	is	symmetrical).	As	each	individual	consumes	1	unit	of	land,	and	as	the	city	is	symmetrical,	the	right	end	of	the	CBD	area	is	defined	by		 𝑦 = 𝑧- = 𝜃𝑙2 	 (2a)	As	there	is	a	positive	communication	cost,	which	increases	with	distance	to	the	CBD,	SBDs	are	 necessarily	 adjacent	 to	 the	 CBD,	 and	 then	 the	 left	 side	 frontier	 of	 SBD	 1,	𝑧- ,	 is	confounded	with	y.		Furthermore,	the	centre	of	SBD	1,	𝑥$	-	having	in	mind	that	(1 − 𝜃)𝑙	individuals	should	be	distributed	over	the	2	SBDs	-	is	defined	by	the	following	equation.			 𝑥$ = 𝜃𝑙2 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑙4 = (1 + 𝜃)𝑙4 		 (2b)	The	limit	of	the	city	corresponds	to	the	left	frontier	of	each	SBD,	given	as	equation	2c.			 𝑧3 = 𝑙2		 (2c)		
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At	equilibrium,	as	in	the	usual	monocentric	models	(see	Fujita,	1989),	utility	level	should	be	the	same	for	each	individual,	and	also	the	consumption	for	non-spatial	goods	E,	which	defines	as:		 𝐸 = 5𝑝(𝑖)𝑞(𝑖)𝑑𝑖 + 𝑞:;: 	 (3)	The	budget	constraint	for	an	individual	residing	at	x	and	working	in	the	CBD,	or	for	an	individual	residing	at	x	and	working	in	a	SBD,	implies	that			 𝑤= + 𝑞:>>> − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑅(𝑥) = 𝐸 = 𝑤$ + 𝑞:>>> − 𝑡|𝑥 − 𝑥$| − 𝑅(𝑥)	 (4)	At	equilibrium,	a	worker	residing	in	y=z1	is	indifferent	between	working	in	the	CBD	or	in	the	SBD,	which	implies	that		 𝑤= − 𝑡𝑦 − 𝑅(𝑦) = 𝑤$ − 𝑡(𝑥$ − 𝑧-) − 𝑅(𝑧-)	 (5)	Since	y=z1	and	R(y)=R(z1)=0,	by	using	the	expressions	of	eqns	(2)	we	obtain	equation	(6).		 𝑤= − 𝑤$ = 𝑡(2𝑦 − 𝑥$) = 𝑡𝑙 B3𝜃 − 14 D	 (6)	This	wage	gap	is	positive	as	long	as	𝜃 > -F.	The	comparative	statics	suggest	that	if	l	or	commuting	cost	t	increases,	the	wage	gap	must	also	increase.	
2.2. Equilibrium Wages and the City Structure 	Equilibrium	wages	are	determined	by	assuming	zero	profit	condition,	i.e.,	the	wage	bill	absorbs	firms’	profit.	Assuming	that	𝜙 = 1,	equilibrium	wages	are			 𝑤=∗ = 𝐼														𝑤$∗ = 𝐼 − 𝜅(𝑥$)															 (7)		Then,	 by	 using	 eqn	 (6),	 the	 expression	 of	 communication	 costs	 (eqn	 (1)),	 and	 finally	equilibrium	wages	(eqn	(7)),	it	is	possible	to	solve	with	respect	to	𝜃,	the	share	of	workers	to	be	located	in	the	CBD,	which	yields	equation	(8).		
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	 𝜃 = 4𝐾 + (𝑡 + 𝑘)𝑙3(𝑡 + 𝑘)𝑙 	 (8)	Such	a	value	is	positive	and	more	than	1/3	IFF	k/3<t.	Assuming	that	this	condition	holds	(in	the	contrary	case,	city	is	always	monocentric),	the	optimal	value	for	𝜃	is		 𝜃∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 M1, 4𝐾 + (𝑡𝜙 + 𝑘)𝑙3(𝑡𝜙 + 𝑘)𝑙 O	 (9)		
Proposition	1	states	that	the	city	will	be	monocentric	iif			 𝒕 ≤ 𝟐𝑲 + 𝒌𝒍𝝓𝒍 	 (10)	
Otherwise	it	will	be	polycentric.		Land	rents	have	the	following	form		 Ψ=(𝑥) = 𝑅(𝑥) = 𝑡 B𝜃∗𝑙2 − 𝑥D 					𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑥 < 𝑦	 (11)	and			 Ψ$(𝑥) = 𝑅(𝑥) = 𝑡 \(1 − 𝜃∗)𝑙4 + 𝑥$ − 𝑥] 					𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑥 > 𝑥$	 (12)	
3. Experimental design This	section	describes	the	situation	game	that	was	played	by	participants	and	sets	 the	theoretical	predictions7.	The	experimental	game	consists	of	two	parts,	the	first	being	a	double-auction	procedure	where	 both	 firms	 and	 workers	 negotiate	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 wage	 salary	 and	workplace,	and	the	second	one	consisting	in	an	auction	procedure	between	workers	that	compete	for	land	(homes)8.	Finding	work	will	give	a	worker	a	salary	and	enable	him	to		
7	The	experimental	 calibration	of	payoffs	 is	explained	 in	appendix	B.	 In	a	nutshell,	payoffs	are	based	on	assumptions	regarding	preferences	for	firms	and	workers	that	are	the	closest	as	possible	to	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2007).	8	Of	course,	 it	 is	an	 important	difference	regarding	Cavailhes	et	al.	 (2007)	model	where	the	equilibrium	process	is	purely	static.	
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consume	a	composite	good,	i.e.,	obtaining	a	certain	amount	of	income.	The	second	step	is	only	for	workers	(ie	players	who	have	found	work)	who	then	compete	for	land	through	a	sealed-bid	second	price	auction	procedure.	
3.1. The Situation Game The	game	consists	of	two	steps,	 the	first	one	where	8	firms	interact	with	8	workers	 in	order	to	define	a	wage	contract	and	a	workplace,	the	second	one	where	only	workers	that	found	a	job	contract	are	bidding	for	a	living	place.		A	line	represents	Land,	with	slots	numbered	from	1	to	11.	A	particular	slot,	located	in	the	middle	of	this	line	is	the	CBD	(Central	Business	District,	located	at	slot	6).	This	CBD	is	pre-specified	since	essential	facilities	required	by	firms	for	production	are	located	there.	In	each	step	of	the	game,	possible	locations	slots	are	proposed	to	participants,	from	slot	1	to	slot	11,	and	including	the	CBD	slot.	Each	worker	must	locate	in	a	living	place	and	there	consumes	exactly	one	slot	and	so	it	is	not	possible	to	have	more	than	one	worker	for	a	given	 slot.	 In	 contrast,	 firms	 are	 free	 to	 locate	 at	 each	 slot	 since	 it	 is	 assumed,	 to	 be	consistent	with	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2007),	that	working	places	are	dimensionless	so	multiple	firms	can	use	the	same	slot	as	a	working	place.	If	a	firm	chooses	a	slot	as	a	working	place	that	is	not	the	CBD,	this	defines	a	Secondary	Business	District	(SBD).	The	only	constraint	for	firms	is	that	they	are	not	able	to	create	more	than	two	SBDs,	the	rule	“first-in,	 first	served”	being	applied.	The	consequence	of	that	is,	as	in	the	initial	model	of	Cavailhes	et	al.,	there	cannot	be	more	than	2	SBDs	next	to	the	existant	CBD.	- First	step:	Defining	the	workplaces	for	firms	and	workers	The	first	step	consists	of	a	double-auction	market	that	aims	at	solving	the	labour	market	and	to	define	the	workplaces.	Firms	need	a	single	worker	to	produce	output	and	face	two	kinds	of	costs	for	producing	revenue,	that	is	wage	and	communication	costs	to	the	CBD.	If	firms	are	not	able	to	find	a	worker,	they	get	0	points	at	the	end	of	this	stage	of	the	game.	Workers	need	to	have	a	 job	(that	 is	 to	define	a	contract	with	a	given	 firm)	 in	order	 to	obtain	revenue	that	corresponds	to	their	net	utility,	and	additionally	a	wage,	even	if	this	wage	is	zero.	If	workers	are	not	able	to	find	a	job,	they	get	20	points	at	the	end	of	the	first	stage	of	the	game	but	are	unable	to	participate	in	the	second	step	of	the	stage	game.	In	stage	1,	both	firms	and	workers	participate	to	a	double-auction	market	when	each	of	them	 proposes	 or	 accepts	 a	 wage	 and	 workplace	 contracts.	 In	 the	 game,	 this	 labour	market	is	opens	for	10	minutes	during	which	each	worker	can	propose	for	each	slot	as	a	working	place	a	wage	ask,	or	a	certain	amount	of	points	he	intends	to	get	as	a	wage.	The	player	provides	and	finds	this	information	through	the	computer	screen	by	looking	at	the	best	wage	 asks	 that	 have	 already	been	made	 for	 each	 slot	 by	 all	workers	 (that	 is,	 the	lowest	wage	requested	by	workers	for	each	slot),	as	well	as	the	best	wage	bids	that	have	been	already	made	by	all	firms	(that	is,	the	highest	wage	offered	by	firms	for	each	slot).	Figure	 1	 shows	 a	 screen	 capture	 of	 the	 computer	 interface	 for	workers,	 and	 figure	 2	
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captures	 the	 screen	 available	 for	 firms.	 The	 interface	was	 computerized	 using	 ZTREE	(Fischbacher,	2007).	
Figure	1.	Double	Auction	computer	interface	for	participants	as	workers	(Hierarchical	
treatment)	
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Figure	2.	Double	Auction	computer	interface	for	participants	as	firms	(Polycentric	
treatment)	
		The	double	auction	rule	applies	as	follows:	When	a	worker	wants	to	make	a	wage	ask,	he	chooses	a	lower	amount	than	those	already	publicly	displayed	and	offered	by	workers	as	a	whole.	In	contrast,	a	firm	wishing	to	make	a	wage	bid	should	propose	higher	amounts	than	those	already	displayed	for	a	given	slot.	Market	clearing	is	achieved	as	usual	when	workers	or	firms	accept	contracts	that	are	publicly	displayed.	The	market	is	closed	after	10	 mn	 duration	 or	 when	 no	 worker/firm	 remains	 available	 for	 a	 job	 contract.	 The	important	 feature	 is	 that	accepting	a	contract	either	 for	a	 firm	or	 for	a	worker	defines	firms’	location	as	workplaces.	At	 the	 end	of	 this	 first	 step,	 firms	are	 located	either	 in	 the	CBD	or	 in	 SBDs.	They	 face	communication	 and	 wage	 costs	 depending	 on	 the	 wage	 contract.	 As	 a	 consequence,	participants	as	firms	already	know	their	final	payoff	for	the	round	at	the	end	of	this	first	step.	On	 the	 other	 side,	 after	 completing	 the	 first	 step,	 workers	 are	 aware	 about	 their	workplace	location	and	personal	wage	level.	The	next	step	is	to	find	a	living	place	with	this	decision	incurring	commuting	costs.	- Second	step:	Finding	a	living	place	for	workers	In	 this	 step,	 only	workers	 participate	 in	 a	 land	market	 that	 opens	 for	 5	minutes.	 The	supply		consists	in	slots	that	are	sold	under	a	sealed-bid	second	price	auction,	for	which	
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each	worker	enters	multiple	bids	for	each	slot	available	(from	1	to	11).	For	each	slot,	the	winning	bidder	pay	the	second-highest	bid.	We	constrain	each	winner	to	have	a	single	slot.	In	case	of	multiple	wins	for	a	given	worker,	she	finally	gets	the	slot	that	defines	the	lowest	distance	to	their	workplace.	In	case	of	multiple	winners	for	a	given	slot	(due	to	equal	maximum	bids),	we	allocate	the	slot	to	the	winning	bidder	for	whom	the	distance	between	 this	 particular	 slot	 and	 his	working	 place	 is	 the	 smallest.	When	 distances	 to	working	place	are	identical,	the	winning	bidder	is	randomly	picked	by	the	computer.	Figure	3	captures	the	screen	available	 for	workers	during	the	second	step	of	 the	stage	regarding	land	market	auction	procedure.	
Figure	3.	Computer	interface	for	workers	in	the	land	auction	procedure	
		
3.2. Experimental treatments The	definition	of	experimental	treatments	is	based	on	proposition	1	by	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2007),	 that	 implies	 that	 an	 increase	 in	 commuting	 cost,	 all	 things	being	equal	 should	break	 the	 monocentric	 city	 (all	 firms	 located	 in	 the	 CBD)	 and	 change	 the	 location	equilibrium	towards	a	hierarchical	city	with	at	least	one	SBD.	A	benchmark	treatment	is	provided	by	assuming	that	communication	costs	do	not	exist	(K=k=0),	that	is	-	following	proposition	 1	 -	 in	 this	 particular	 case,	 city	 should	 be	 polycentric	 (i.e.,	 structured	 in	 3	workplaces	having	the	same	size	and	where	population	of	workers	is	evenly	distributed,	land	rents	and	wages	being	equal	in	each	workplace).	
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For	all	the	treatments	described	below,	we	assume	that	ϕ	is	1	and	l	is	8.	Moreover,	land	rents	 values	 described	 in	 the	 graph	 or	 text	 are	 only	 related	 to	 relative	 levels,	 not	 to	absolute	values	since	these	depend	on	utilities	and	consumption	about	non-spatial	goods	for	the	workers	(see	above).	In	order	to	have	a	hierarchical	treatment	with	L=n=8,	this	 implies	from	the	theoretical	prediction	 that	 4	 persons	 locate	 in	 the	 CBD	 (i.e.,	θ*=0.5),	 and	 the	 calibration	 function	between	t,	K	and	k	is:	 𝑡 = 𝐾 + 3𝑘	Values	of	t,	K	and	k	will	also	give	the	bid	rent	function	for	land	(see	equations	for	that	in	section	1).	
321. Treatment 1 (benchmark): Polycentric City In	this	case,	as	there	is	no	communication	cost	to	the	CBD	for	firms,	firms	and	workers	have	no	reason	to	locate	in	the	CBD,	and	workers-firms	split	between	3	workplaces.	The	value	of	𝜃∗	is	1/3	and	the	limit	points	(see	eqn	1)	for	the	city	are	x=4/3,	8/3	and	4.	The	following	graph	illustrates	theoretical	predictions	for	bid	levels.	
Figure	4.	Rents	and	Limit	points	in	Polycentric	City	Treatment	(K=0,	k=0,	t=9)	
	Of	course,	as	the	number	of	workers/firms	is	an	even	number	and	not	divisible	by	3,	there	is	no	possibility	to	have	all	possible	workplaces	with	an	equal	number	of	firms.	This	pitfall	is	justified	by	the	fact	that	the	most	important	issue	for	this	experiment	is	to	obtain	limit	points	that	correspond	to	discrete	locations	or	actual	slots	that	exist	in	the	experiment.	
L=n=8	has	been	chosen	following	a	series	of	numerical	simulations	in	which	it	was	found	that	it	is	almost	impossible	to	have	integer	values	for	workplaces	location	if	L<8.	
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In	this	benchmark	treatment,	there	is	no	particular	incentive	to	locate	in	the	CBD	for	firms,	since	 no	 communication	 cost	 exists.	 The	 only	 concern	 for	 workers	 is	 being	 able	 to	maximize	wages	as	well	as	minimizing	commuting	costs	between	a	workplace	and	a	home	place,	there	should	be	bidding	functions	for	land	that	depends	on	first	step	location	choice	for	firms.	As	firms	are	indifferent	to	any	given	slot	as	a	particular	location	there	should	be	no	relationship	between	bids	levels	for	home	and	distance	to	the	CBD.	The	comparative	statics	of	 the	model	described	 in	 the	previous	section	define	 the	 two	following	 treatments,	 i.e.,	 the	 monocentric	 and	 the	 hierarchical	 ones.	 In	 the	 case	 of	positive	communication	costs	(K>0,	k>0),	if	K=3	and	k=2,	the	threshold	value	for	t	is	2.75.	As	a	consequence,	if	t	is	less	than	this	value,	the	locational	urban	equilibrium,	should	be	consistent	with	a	monocentric	city,	whereas	if	it	is	above	this	threshold,	the	city	structure	should	be	hierarchical.		
322. Monocentric City Treatment In	the	monocentric	city	treatment,	commuting	cost	is	low	compared	to	communication	cost,	so	there	is	no	incentive	for	firms/workers	to	locate	far	from	the	CBD.	The	following	graph	illustrates	this	point	and	describes	equilibrium	bid	rent	values.		Figure	5.	Rents	and	Limit	Points	in	Monocentric	City	Treatment	(K=3,	k=2,	t=1)	
	
323. Hierarchical City Treatment By	 contrast,	 if	 communication	 cost	 is	 low	 compared	 to	 commuting	 cost,	 then	workers	have	a	strong	incentive	to	locate	outside	the	CBD.	The	graph	below	shows	the	emergence	of	polycentric	hierarchical	structure	where	bid-rent	functions	do	not	have	the	same	slope,	as	in	the	polycentric	treatment,	and	where	the	total	amount	of	bids	that	will	be	paid	for	a	CBD	location	is	higher	than	the	sum	of	bids	for	each	SBD.	
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Figure	6.	Land	Rents	and	Limit	Points	in	Hierarchical	City	Treatment	(K=3,	k=2,	t=9)	
		
3.3. Theoretical predictions (one-shot stage game) Communication	 costs	 are	 the	 support	 for	defining	optimal	wage	bids	 for	homogenous	firms.	 Indeed,	 the	 greater	 is	 the	 communication	 cost,	 the	 fewer	wages	 bids	 should	 be	distant	from	the	slot	where	essential	facilities	are	located.	As	the	payoff	for	firms	if	they	do	 not	 succeed	 to	 have	 a	worker	 is	 zero,	 then	 each	 firm	 should	 be	willing	 to	 pay	 for	slots	from	1	to	11:	 𝑤_^ = 𝜋 − (𝐾 + 𝑘|𝑠 − 6|)	The	consequence	is	that	firms	play	a	coordination	game	where	each	firm	gets	epsilon	at	the	Nash	equilibrium9	and	is	located	at	each	slot	indifferently.	For	 any	 worker,	 the	 optimal	 distribution	 of	 bids	 among	 available	 slots,	 as	 Vickrey’s	auction	rule	ensures	full	revelation,	should	be	the	value	of	income	plus	his	wage,	minus	potential	commuting	cost,	the	latter	depending	on	workplace	determined	in	step	1.	Assuming	 that	 wages	 that	 could	 be	 proposed	 by	 firms	 decrease	 necessarily	 with	 the	distance	 to	 CBD	 as	 a	 result	 of	 increasing	 communication	 costs,	 some	 behavioural	conjectures	regarding	competition	for	land	between	workers	can	be	established.	
331. Conjectures relative to the intensity of competition between workers for living places The	first	and	easiest	behavioural	conjecture	concerns	bidding	behaviour	on	land	market.	Assuming	the	highest	wages	are	to	be	found	in	the	CBD,	workers	having	a	workplace	in		
9	That	corresponds	precisely	 to	Cavailhes	et	al.	 (2007)	where	operating	profits	are	completely	absorbed	 by	 the	 wage	 bill,	 equilibrium	 wage	 wedge	 being	 proportional	 to	 the	 level	 of	communication	cost.	
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the	CBD	should	bid	higher	for	living	places	lying	in	the	CBD	or	being	close	compared	to	the	farthest	ones.	For	those	workers,	bids	should	decrease	linearly	with	distance	to	the	CBD	both	for	hierarchical	and	monocentric	treatments.	For	the	polycentric	treatment,	as	there	is	no	incentive	for	firms	to	locate	in	the	CBD,	bids	should	not	depend	on	the	distance	with	it,	unless	workplace	being	there.	But	under	a	hierarchical	treatment,	workers	that	do	not	work	within	the	CBD	but	instead	in	a	SBD	should	bid	higher	for	land	not	in	the	CBD	as	compared	to	workers	that	work	in	the	CBD.	Moreover,	under	a	monocentric	treatment,	workers	in	the	CBD	should	always	bid	higher	than	workers	not	working	in	the	CBD.	
332. Conjectures relative to locational equilibrium in the City When	communication	costs	exist	(that	is,	for	Monocentric	and	Hierarchical	treatments),	firms	 should	 choose	 to	 locate	 in	 the	 CBD	 by	 proposing	 wages	 that	 are	 around	 their	revenue	 (since	 operating	 profits	 should	 be	 completely	 absorbed	 by	 the	 wage	 bill).	Following	that,	if	commuting	costs	are	sufficiently	small,	workers	should	prefer	to	accept	contracts	with	maximum	wages	associated	to	workplaces	lying	in	the	CBD	even	if	they	have	to	face	commuting	costs.	Therefore,	in	the	Monocentric	treatment	where	commuting	cost	is	small	compared	to	communication	costs	faced	by	firms,	Nash	equilibrium	consists	in	having	all	firms	in	the	CBD,	and	workers	choosing	to	live	nearby	the	CBD,	with	the	bid	rent	function	declining	slowly	with	the	distance	to	it.	In	contrast,	when	commuting	cost	is	sufficiently	high	relatively	to	communication	cost,	such	equilibrium	is	not	a	stable	equilibrium,	since	workers	have	an	incentive	to	accept	contracts	with	 lower	wages	as	the	firm	locates	further	from	the	CBD	as	such	contracts	enable	 workers	 to	 decrease	 commuting	 costs.	 Consequently,	 in	 the	 Hierarchical	treatment,	workers	are	incentivised	to	propose	lower	wages	to	the	firm	for	a	workplace	that	does	not	correspond	to	the	CBD.	In	this	treatment,	having	all	firms	in	the	CBD	is	not	a	locational	equilibrium.	
4. Experimental results 
4.1. Procedure and experimental sessions As	far	as	possible,	each	session	uses	32	subjects.	Each	participant	is	randomly	attached	to	a	group	of	16	players.	Types	(firms	or	workers)	are	also	randomly	drawn	at	the	beginning	of	 the	 session.	 Each	 participant	 is	 required	 to	 participate	 under	 one	 experimental	treatment	 (either	 Monocentric	 or	 Hierarchical)	 in	 a	 between-subject	 design,	 this	information	being	identified	after	the	 instructions	are	read10	and	some	comprehension		
10 	Instructions	 were	 framed	 using	 words	 like	 «	city	»,	 «	firms	»,	 «	workers	»,	 «	wage	»,	 «	land	 rent	»,	«	transport	 costs	»	 etc.	 It	 is	more	 usual	 in	 an	 experiment	 to	 avoid	 context	 specific	words	 but	with	 this	complex	 experiment	 the	 use	 of	 abstract	 concepts	 for	 this	 problem	of	 location	 choice	 could	 give	 rise	 to	confusion	 in	 participants’	 mind.	 	 This	 would	 have	 undermined	 the	 participant’s	 understanding	 of	 the	
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questions	being	completed.	After	that,	participants	make	a	first	practice	round	followed	by	4	rounds	 for	real.	Each	participant	remains	either	a	worker	or	a	 firm	for	the	entire	session.	The	payoff	was	determined	by	drawing	one	particular	round	for	each	subject,	in	order	to	avoid	any	income	effect.	Each	 session	 lasted	 between	 2	 hours	 and	 2	 hours	 15mins,	 with	 an	 average	 payoff	 of	approximately	AU$40.		Experimental	sessions	were	undertaken	at	the	Experimental	Computer	Laboratory	of	the	School	of	Economics,	The	University	of	Sydney	with	272	participants	from	various	fields	and	levels	(42%	from	the	Economics	and	Business	field,	58%	from	Engineering,	Law	and	others).	A	detailed	breakdown	of	the	experimental	sessions	is	given	in	table	1.	
Table	1.	Experimental	Procedure	and	Data	description	Experimental	treatment	 Parameters	 Number	of	participants	 Number	of	groups	Polycentric	City	 K=k=0	;	t=9	 80	 5	Monocentric	City	 K=3	;	k=2	;	t=1	 96	 6	Hierarchical	City	 K=3	;	k=2	;	t=9	 96	 6	Total	 	 272	 17		
4.2. Location of the workplaces One	important	consequence	of	behavioural	conjectures	presented	above	is	that	locational	equilibrium	within	the	city	should	be	different	between	experimental	treatments,	as	the	relative	weight	between	communication	costs	and	commuting	cost	is	changing.	The	next	subsection	 is	 to	 describe	 experimental	 results	 for	 firms	 regarding	 locational	 choice	defined	by	the	job	contract.	The	last	subsection	focuses	on	worker’s	competitive	bidding	behaviour	regarding	his	living	place.	The	first	evidence	is	dedicated	to	job	contracts	that	are	to	define	a	wage	for	the	worker	and	a	location	place	for	the	firm	that	is	also	a	workplace	for	the	workers.	The	following	figures	 present	 the	 distribution	 of	 chosen	 workplaces	 throughout	 the	 different	experimental	treatments.	
	economic	situation	they	are	placed	in	(See	Bohm,	2002).	More	important,	avoiding	this	framing	would	have	increased	the	length	of	instructions,	which	were	already	quite	long	given	the	complexity	of	our	game	(30	minutes	on	average	were	used	from	the	beginning	of	the	session	to	the	computerized	game	in	giving	the	participants	instructions).	
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Figure	7.	Distribution	of	workplaces,	polycentric	treatment	(periods	1	to	4)												Recall	 that	 the	 theoretical	 prediction	 is	 that	 there	 should	 not	 be	 any	 particular	concentration	 of	 firms	 in	 slot	 6	 that	 represents	 the	 CBD	where	 essential	 facilities	 are	exogenously	located,	since	no	communication	costs	exist	for	firms.		Indeed,	around	40%	of	job	contracts	firms	finally	locate	in	this	particular	slot,	which	is	significantly	above	any	particular	frequency	that	was	observed	for	other	slots,	as	figure	7	suggests.	This	result,	which	does	not	correspond	to	theoretical	predictions,	is	probably	due	 to	 a	 framing	 effect	 of	 the	 experimental	 design.	 In	 the	 experimental	 instruction,	“Firms”	 are	 told	 that	 they	 can	 choose	 to	 locate	 either	 at	 slot	 6	 or	 at	 two	 other	 slots	depending	on	the	actual	choices	for	firms	on	a	first	in	first	served	basis.	That	is,	if	firm	1	chooses	to	locate	at	slot	1,	being	the	first	to	make	a	contract	with	a	given	worker,	and	if	firm	2	chooses	then	to	locate	at	slot	2,	being	the	second	to	make	a	contract	with	another	worker,	then	remaining	firms	must	choose	a	location	slot	that	is	either	slot	1,	slot	2	or	slot	6.	The	 reason	 for	proceeding	with	 this	 rule	 is	 to	 give	 consistency	with	 the	 theoretical	model	of	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2007),	where	firms	do	not	consume	space,	but	where	only	two	Secondary	Business	Districts	are	possible,	giving	a	total	number	of	workplaces	of	no	more	than	three.	By	just	saying	that	firms	should	choose	either	slot	6,	or	2	other	slots,	as	our	game	is	a	coordination	game	with	multiple	locational	equilibriums,	we	probably	produce	a	focal	effect	(Schelling,	1960)	on	slot	6.	Of	course,	as	the	formulation	given	to	participants	was	the	same	in	all	treatments,	this	focus	could	partly	explain	the	experimental	results.	But	recall	that	we	are	mainly	interested	in	the	differences	between	treatments,	and	to	that	respect,	 if	 our	 behavioural	 conjectures	may	 be	 confirmed,	we	 should	 have	 significant	differences	 about	 firm	 concentration	 depending	 on	 experimental	 treatments.	 In	particular,	 as	 communication	 costs	 are	 positive,	 concentration	 of	 firms	 in	 CBD	 should	
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increase	sharply.	Figures	8a	and	8b	display	the	distribution	of	workplaces	in	treatments	where	communication	costs	become	positive.	
Figure	8a.	Distribution	of	workplaces,	
monocentric	treatment	
Figure	8b.	Distribution	of	workplaces,	
hierarchical	treatment	
	 		Figures	8a	and	8b	summarize	the	distribution	of	the	workplaces	defined	by	job	contracts	between	workers	and	firms	located	either	in	the	monocentric	treatment	(left	side)	or	in	the	 hierarchical	 treatment	 (right	 side).	 There	 is	 a	 clear	 difference	 between	 each	treatment,	including	the	polycentric	one	(figure	7	above),	regarding	the	density	of	firms	to	 be	 located	 in	 the	 CBD	 (slot	 6).	 This	 frequency	 is	 around	 86%	 for	 the	monocentric	treatment,	 65%	 for	 the	 hierarchical	 treatment,	 and	 only	 38.6%	 for	 the	 polycentric	treatment.	Moreover,	 the	experimental	data	 indicate	a	pattern	of	 learning	 for	participants,	 as	 the	following	figures	about	the	distribution	of	workplaces	in	the	last	period	show	below.		
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Figure	10.	Distribution	of	slots	as	workplaces,	Polycentric	treatment,	last	period	
	
Figure	11.	Distribution	of	slots	as	
workplaces,	Monocentric	treatment,	last	
period	
Figure	12.	Distribution	of	slots	as	
workplaces,	Hierarchical	treatment,	last	
period	
	 		For	 the	 last	 period,	 the	 frequency	 of	 slot	 6	 as	 a	 workplace	 is	 around	 95%	 in	 the	monocentric	 treatment,	 close	 to	60%	 in	 the	hierarchical	one,	but	drops	 to	32%	 in	 the	polycentric	treatment.	Contract	wages	must	 also	 reflect	 the	 trade-off	 individuals	 are	 to	make	within	 the	 job	market	between	commuting	costs	borne	by	workers	and	communication	costs	borne	by	firms.	When	 commuting	 cost	 is	 low	 compared	 to	 communication	 costs,	workers	 have	some	market	 power	 in	 order	 to	 negotiate	 higher	wages,	wherever	 their	workplace	 is,	since	commuting	cost	does	not	matter	so	much.	In	contrast,	when	commuting	cost	is	high	compared	to	communication	costs	(hierarchical	treatment),	workers	might	be	willing	to	accept	lower	wages	if	a	firm	proposes	a	contract	that	implies	a	workplace	outside	the	CBD.	In	the	same	way,	workers	may	negotiate	higher	wages	for	having	a	workplace	in	the	CBD,	since	it	is	likely	that	in	the	second	step,	they	may	not	obtain	the	CBD	slot	as	a	possible	home	(there	is	just	one	living	place	and	all	firms	should	be	there).	The	following	figure	
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displays	the	average	contract	wage	depending	on	workplace,	such	for	each	experimental	treatment.	
Figure	13.	Average	contract	wage	per	slot	(trial	period	was	excluded)	
		Even	 if	 the	 average	 wage	 is	 not	 significantly	 different	 for	 all	 three	 treatments	 for	workplaces	that	lie	in	the	CBD,	there	is	a	sharp	decrease	of	contract	wage	as	distance	from	CBD	 increases	 under	Hierarchical	 treatment,	when	 the	 contract	wage	 remains	 almost	constant	 as	 this	distance	 grows	under	 the	monocentric	 treatment.	 For	 the	polycentric	treatment,	as	expected,	no	clear	trend	emerges.	A	strange	asymmetry	is	also	to	be	noticed:	The	average	wage	contract	at	the	left	of	CBD	is	higher	than	average	wage	contract	to	the	right	of	the	CBD,	without	any	possible	clear	interpretation	of	this	behavioural	pattern.	Another	 interesting	 observation	 is	 that	 average	 wage	 is	 lower	 in	 the	 polycentric	treatment	compared	to	the	other	treatments	that	implement	a	positive	communication	cost	 for	 firms	 (respectively	 4.11	 vs.	 7	 for	 the	monocentric	 treatment	 and	 5.9	 for	 the	hierarchical	one).	This	could	be	partly	due	to	the	fact	that,	 in	polycentric	treatment,	as	firms	 do	 not	 incur	 any	 communication	 cost	 for	 accessing	 essential	 facilities,	 their	bargaining	power	for	choosing	job	contract	(workplace	and	wage)	is	higher	than	in	the	other	treatments.	The	consequence	is	therefore	that	workers	obtain	lower	wages	in	this	particular	situation.	
4.3. Worker’s bidding behaviour for land In	the	case	when	a	given	worker	obtains	a	job	contract	in	step	1,	defining	her	workplace	and	 her	 wage,	 she	 gets	 a	 maximum	 total	 income	 of	 91	 points	 in	 order	 to	 make	simultaneous	bids	on	each	possible	slot	to	choose	it	as	a	living	place.	She	might	obtain	at	most	one	single	living	place.	Depending	on	the	experimental	treatment,	and	the	incentives	
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firms	have	to	locate	in	the	CBD,	balanced	by	potential	commuting	costs	for	workers,	bids	are	to	differ.	In	the	polycentric	treatment,	as	there	is	no	particular	reason	to	have	a	higher	density	 for	 workplaces	 (communication	 costs	 are	 null),	 firms	 decisions	 represent	 a	coordination	 game	 where	 each	 firm	 could	 be	 located	 in	 each	 workplace.	 Then,	 as	commuting	costs	are	quite	high	in	this	treatment,	the	nearer	living	place	from	workplace,	the	better	for	workers.	The	following	graph	displays	average	bids	for	each	slot	as	a	possible	living	place	for	the	last	period,	and	thus	for	each	experimental	treatment.		
Figure	14.	Average	bid	per	slot	as	a	home	
		As	 expected,	 there	 is	 no	 particular	 trend	 for	 workers’	 home	 bids	 in	 the	 polycentric	treatment,	 the	 bidding	 curve	 exhibiting	 either	 sharp	 increases	 or	 sharp	 decreases	 as	distance	from	CBD	rises.	For	the	monocentric	treatment,	a	peak	should	be	observed	for	a	location	place	in	the	CBD,	which	 is	clearly	 the	case:	A	clear	and	steady	decrease	 for	 living	places	nearer	 the	CBD	could	be	seen	in	the	graph,	which	is	quite	consistent	with	the	bid-rent	curve	predicted	at	equilibrium	for	these	particular	values	of	commuting	cost	and	communication	cost.	For	the	hierarchical	treatment,	it	is	important	to	notice	that,	consistently	with	theoretical	model,	there	is	a	slight	decrease	in	bid-rents	for	living	places	near	CBD	(for	a	distance	not	less	than	3	units),	and	then	a	sharp	decrease	in	rents	proposed	by	workers	for	the	farthest	locations.	
Figure	15.	Box	Plots	of	Individual	Bids	by	workers	for	workplace	as	a	home	place	
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 Lecture	note:	Slots	are	numbered	from	1	to	11,	missing	values	corresponding	to	slots	that	were	not	chosen	as	a	workplace	during	step	1.	‘Poly’	is	for	polycentric	treatment,	‘Mono’	and	‘Hierarc’	are	respectively	for	monocentric	and	hierarchical	ones.			The	average	value	of	bids	for	a	particular	workplace	did	not	exhibit	any	clear	trend	for	the	polycentric	treatment,	as	expected	given	the	theoretical	model.	On	the	contrary,	for	the	monocentric	treatment,	it	is	possible	to	observe	that	the	maximum	average	bid	is	for	slot	6,	which	is	the	CBD,	this	fact	being	a	clear	prediction	of	the	theoretical	model.	For	the	hierarchical	 treatment,	 things	 are	 less	 clear-cut.	 If	 slot	 1	 is	 excluded	 (the	 extreme	 left	frontier	for	the	city),	the	trend	is	also	to	have	a	decrease	in	bids	as	workplace	is	farther	from	CBD.	It	is	also	interesting	to	observe	that	high	bids	could	be	made	for	workplaces	that	are	not	located	in	CBD,	like	slot	1	or	slot	4.	In	order	to	disentangle	all	the	effects	that	might	drive	bidding	decisions	for	workers,	we	conduct	a	parametric	analysis	based	upon	a	Tobit	Analysis	at	the	individual	level11.	The	dependent	variable	is	the	level	of	bid	for	each	slot	by	each	participant,	for	all	periods	with	excluding	 trial	 period.	 Explanatory	 variables	 are	 socioeconomic	 and	 demographic	characteristics,	 and	 more	 important,	 wage	 level	 for	 the	 worker,	 and	 the	 potential	
	
11		Tobit	model	is	used	since	we	restrict	possible	bid	prices	from	0	to	a	maximum	of	140	in	order	to	avoid	potential	losses	that	could	arise	in	a	Vickrey’s	auction	process	(Cooper	and	Fang,	2008).	
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commuting	 cost	 associated	 to	 a	particular	 location	 for	home.	The	 results	 of	 this	Tobit	analysis	are	given	in	the	table	below.	
	
Table	2:	Tobit	analysis	of	individual	bids	for	home	
	 Treatment	Explanatory	variables	
Polycentric	 Monocentric	 Hierarchical	
Potential	commuting	cost		Period		Age		Gender	(=1	if	male)		Activity	(=1	if	any	activity)		Level		Field	(=1	if	economics	&	management)		Wage		Constant		
-0.620***	(0.0265)	2.685***	(0.513)	-0.477***	(0.132)	0.782	(1.285)	9.456***	(1.322)	-0.548	(0.531)	7.613***	(1.163)	0.855***	(0.263)	23.22***	(3.189)	
-2.266***	(0.169)	0.865***	(0.130)	-0.676***	(0.112)	2.917***	(0.582)	2.531***	(0.609)	1.994***	(0.350)	4.181***	(0.627)	0.791***	(0.119)	16.11***	(2.364)	
-0.762***	(0.0240)	2.385***	(0.351)	-0.224**	(0.109)	-2.068**	(0.882)	1.140	(0.756)	1.569***	(0.489)	0.727	(0.829)	1.088***	(0.118)	20.28***	(2.750)	Observations	 1738	 2057	 2079	Log.	Likelihood	 -6396.39	 -7854.04	 -7303.69	NB:	***	means	significant	at	the	1%	level,	**	at	the	5%	level,	*	at	the	10%	level.	Some	 socio-demographic	 variables	 are	 highly	 significant,	 as	 ‘field’	 and	 ‘activity’:	Economists	 and	 salaries	 tend	 to	bid	higher	 than	other	participants.	Older	participants	tend	to	bid	less	than	younger	ones.	We	do	not	observe	any	gender	or	level	effect.		More	important,	we	observe	that,	as	commuting	cost	potentially	rises	when	distance	to	working	place	 increases,	 participants	 tend	 to	 bid	 lower,	 which	 is	 quite	 reasonable.	 But	 if	coefficients	have	expected	signs,	the	value	for	this	particular	coefficient	tend	to	be	very	different	 when	 experimental	 treatments	 are	 compared.	 The	 highest	 coefficient	 is	
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observed	 in	the	monocentric	 treatment	and	the	 lowest	 in	the	polycentric	one.	The	 last	effect	 to	notice	 is	about	 learning	 (‘Period’	variable),	participants	bidding	higher	as	 the	game	is	repeated.		
5. Concluding comments The	aim	of	our	experiment	was	to	investigate	how	firms	and	households	choose	a	location	place	 when	 confronted	 to	 communication	 costs	 or	 to	 travel	 costs.	 	 To	 this	 end,	 our	experimental	design	inspires	upon	the	theoretical	model	of	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2007)	where	firms	 are	 to	 incur	 communication	 costs	 with	 the	 CBD	 where	 essential	 facilities	 are	exogenously	located	and	households	could	face	commuting	costs	related	to	the	distance	between	home	and	workplace.	Our	experiment	consists	in	implementing	a	two-step	game	where	firms	and	workers	are	to	interact.	In	a	first	step,	a	double	auction	market	where	workers	and	firms	negotiate	in	order	to	define	a	contract	characterized	by	a	wage	and	a	working	place	 is	settled.	 In	a	second	step,	workers	compete	 for	 land	 in	order	to	 find	a	living	place.	Urban	 equilibrium	 results	 from	 the	 bargaining	 between	 firms	 and	 workers	 that	 are	confronted	to	different	costs.	In	our	experiment,	high	commuting	costs	for	workers	and	no	communication	costs	for	firms	define	our	benchmark	treatment,	which	should	produce	the	polycentric	structure	as	the	outcome.	In	this	benchmark	case,	no	firm	as	a	particular	incentive	 to	 locate	 in	 the	 CBD,	 and	 as	 a	 consequence,	 competition	 between	 workers	should	not	imply	higher	bids	for	homes	located	in	the	CBD	or	adjacent	to	it.	Other	 experimental	 treatments	 are	 characterized	by	positive	 communication	 costs	 for	firms	and	therefore,	the	urban	structure	for	the	city	at	equilibrium	depend	to	commuting	costs	faced	by	workers.	If	it	is	low,	then	workers	could	accept	to	live	far	from	the	CBD,	as	firms	will	try	to	avoid	communication	costs	by	locating	there,	being	able	therefore	to	offer	higher	wages.	This	situation	defines	our	monocentric	treatment.	On	 the	contrary,	when	commuting	costs	are	high,	workers	 should	be	willing	 to	accept	lower	wages	in	order	to	convince	firms	to	locate	far	from	the	CBD.	Indeed,	anticipating	that	positive	communication	costs	will	give	some	incentive	for	firms	to	locate	in	the	CBD	and	that	bidding	competition	for	home	could	be	high	between	them,	they	should	prefer	to	have	 lower	 wages	 that	 compensate	 higher	 communication	 costs	 for	 firms.	 Therefore,	secondary	business	districts	could	exist	along	the	CBD,	where	wages	should	be	lower.	This	last	situation	defines	our	hierarchical	treatment.	Our	 experimental	 results	 confirm	 partially	 these	 conjectures	 about	 theoretical	equilibriums.	 In	 the	polycentric	 treatment,	density	of	 firms	 tends	 to	be	uniform	as	 the	game	is	repeated,	whereas	in	the	monocentric	treatment,	almost	all	firms	choose	to	locate	
	 26	
in	the	CBD.	As	expected,	the	hierarchical	treatment	exhibits	intermediate	results.	These	empirical	results	are	in	line	with	the	main	conclusions	by	Cavailhes	et	al.	(2007).		Concerning	bidding	behaviour	by	workers	about	living	places,	evidence	is	more	mixed.	Average	bids	for	living	places	are	approximately	the	same	whatever	the	distance	to	CBD	in	the	polycentric	treatment,	which	is	to	be	expected.	On	the	contrary,	peak	values	are	observed	 for	 bids	made	 on	 living	 places	 that	 belong	 to	 CBD	 for	 the	 other	 treatments,	different	 shapes	 for	 bid-rent	 function	 being	 observed	 between	 hierarchical	 and	monocentric	treatments.	One	 important	 lesson	 that	 could	 be	 taken	 from	 our	 experiment	 is	 that	 not	 only	 the	magnitude	 but	 also	 the	 relative	 balance	 between	 transport	 costs	 and	 communication	costs	might	produce	different	urban	structures,	by	affecting	deeply	locational	equilibrium	within	the	city.	In	particular,	if	public	decision-makers	are	willing	to	avoid	urban	sprawl	in	order	to	decrease	negative	externalities	related	to	daily	commuting	costs,	increasing	travel	costs	by	raising	taxes	on	oil	for	instance	for	households	is	not	necessarily	the	good	answer,	as	such	policy	might	disrupt	locational	equilibrium	from	a	monocentric	structure	to	a	more	polycentric	one.			  
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7. Appendix A: Experimental Instructions (hierarchical 
treatment) 
Instructions	
Please	do	not	read	this	material	until	instructed	to.	
Please	do	not	touch	your	computer	until	we	have	completed	the	instructions.	
Welcome Thank	you	for	coming	to	today’s	experiment.	Please	do	not	talk	with	anyone.	If	you	have	any	question,	please	raise	your	hand-	an	experimenter	will	come	over	and	answer	your	question	privately.	This	is	a	decision-making	experiment.	You	will	be	asked	to	make	many	decisions,	which	the	 object	 is	 to	 score	 as	 many	 points	 as	 possible.	 All	 of	 your	 decisions	 will	 be	 kept	completely	anonymous.	Your	decisions	and	the	decisions	of	others	will	determine	how	many	points	you	will	earn.	These	points	will	be	changed	in	Australian	Dollars	at	the	end	of	the	session,	defining	your	final	payoff.	Moreover,	you	will	get	a	participation	fee	of	10$.	We	will	 pay	 you	 in	 cash	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment.	 However,	 you	will	 not	 receive	anything	if	you	leave	before	the	end	of	the	experiment.		
The players In	this	experiment,	there	are	32	participants.	These	32	participants	will	be	split	randomly	into	2	groups	of	16	participants.	You	will	be	allocated	to	one	of	these	groups	randomly	by	the	central	computer.	In	 this	 experiment,	 you	 will	 form	 a	 group	 of	 16	 participants.	 You	 and	 the	 other	 15	participants	will	remain	partners	during	the	entire	experiment.		In	each	group,	 there	will	be	 two	types	of	players,	 firms	and	workers.	Your	 type	will	be	chosen	randomly	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment,	and	your	computer	will	recall	your	type	during	the	experiment.	Your	type	will	not	change	over	the	entire	experiment,	and	other	participants	will	not	know	which	type	had	been	attributed	to	you	personally.	In	the	same	 way,	 you	 will	 not	 know	 what	 will	 be	 the	 type	 of	 your	 partners	during	 the	experiment.	There	will	be	8	participants	as	firms	and	8	participants	as	workers.		You	will	 interact	with	the	other	participants	during	5	rounds.	The	first	round	will	be	a	trial	one’s,	and	no	point	can	be	gained	or	lost	during	this	trial.	The	last	four	rounds	are	for	
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real	and	will	give	you	some	points.	At	the	end	of	the	experiment,	one	of	these	four	rounds	will	be	randomly	chosen	by	the	computer	and	the	points	you	gained	in	this	round	will	be	exchanged	in	Australian	dollars	according	the	following	rate:		 1	point	=	$AU	0.5	
The principle of the game 	In	this	game,	workers	have	to	find	a	job	and	also	to	locate	in	a	certain	place	within	the	city.	Firms	have	 to	 find	 one	worker	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 goods	 and	 should	 also	 locate	 in	 a	certain	place	within	the	city.	In	the	city,	some	essential	facilities	that	are	a	necessity	for	firms	to	be	able	to	produce	goods	are	located	on	a	certain	slot.	If	firms	do	not	locate	on	this	given	slot,	they	will	have	to	pay	a	cost	in	order	to	reach	these	essential	facilities.	This	cost	depends	on	the	distance	between	firm’s	location	and	the	place	where	facilities	are	located.	Workers	have	also	to	choose	a	location	place	as	home.	As	workers	will	have	a	workplace	depending	on	their	job,	if	a	worker’s	home	place	differs	from	his	workplace,	he	will	have	to	pay	a	transport	cost	depending	on	the	distance	between	his	workplace	and	his	home.	Each	round	in	this	experiment	consists	in	2	steps.		
The	first	step	will	consist	in	a	job	market	where	both	all	firms	and	all	workers	interact	in	order	to	find	a	job	contract.	Indeed,	firms	need	workers	to	produce	goods	and	have	to	find	one	worker	for	each	round,	no	more	no	less.	If	firms	do	not	succeed	to	have	a	worker,	they	get	0	point	for	the	entire	round.	If	workers	do	not	succeed	to	be	employed	by	any	firm,	they	get	20	points	for	the	entire	round.	Moreover,	firms	will	have	to	choose	a	certain	slot	for	location.	This	location	will	be	defined	by	the	job	contract	they	get	with	a	given	worker.	This	location	will	also	be	the	workplace	for	the	worker	that	had	been	hired	by	the	firm.	
The	second	step	is	only	with	workers	who	are	to	compete	for	available	slots	in	order	to	find	a	home.	There	will	be	a	certain	number	of	slots	as	homes	that	are	available,	but	for	each	slot	there	can	be	only	at	most	one	worker.	That	is,	it	is	not	possible	to	have	2	workers	or	more	on	a	given	slot.	But	 it	 is	possible	 to	have	more	 than	one	 firm	on	a	given	slot.	Workers	will	have	to	make	some	bids	over	each	home	slot,	and	the	highest	bidder	will	win	the	corresponding	slot	as	a	home.	Then,	the	distance	between	a	worker	work	place	and	his	home	will	imply	transport	costs	for	him.	If	a	worker	succeeds	to	have	a	home	at	his	work	place,	there	is	no	transport	cost.	But	the	longer	the	distance	to	his	work	place,	the	higher	transport	costs.	All	these	steps	will	be	explained	more	deeply	now.	
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Specific instructions for firms’ type As	a	firm,	you	will	need	2	inputs	to	produce	revenue	from	your	sales.	This	revenue	you	will	get	if	you	are	able	to	produce	will	be	18	points.	To	produce	you	will	need	to	recruit	
one	employee	that	will	get	a	wage	that	you	paid	as	a	 firm.	The	wage	value	will	be	subtracted	from	your	revenue	at	the	end	of	the	round.		The	other	output	you	need	is	
essential	facilities	that	are	located	in	slot	6.	Depending	on	your	location	choice	(that	is	the	final	slot	you	choose	to	locate),	you	will	have	to	bear	a	communication	cost	in	order	to	access	these	essential	facilities.	The	cost	will	be	the	following:	
Communication	cost	for	accessing	facilities	=	3	points	+	2	points	(times)	distance	to	slot	6	For	instance,	if	you	locate	in	slot	4,	the	distance	to	Essential	Facilities	is	2	(that	is,	6-2),	and	you	will	pay	as	a	firm	a	communication	cost	of	3	+	2	X2	=	7	points.	If	you	locate	in	slot	8	for	instance,	the	distance	is	also	of	2	slots	(8-6),	and	then	the	cost	will	be	also	7	points.	This	communication	cost	will	be	subtracted	from	your	revenue,	as	wage	will	be.	Note	that	if	you	are	not	able	to	recruit	an	employee,	there	is	no	revenue	for	the	firm,	but	there	will	also	be	no	cost,	and	consequently,	you	will	win	0	point	for	the	round.	Firms	only	participate	to	the	first	step	(the	labour	market),	since	the	second	step	is	only	a	concern	for	workers	(the	land	market).	Workers	will	also	participate	in	the	first	step	since	they	will	be	able	to	make	proposals	regarding	the	wages	they	ask	for.	In	this	first	step,	labour	market	will	open	for	10’.	During	this	time,	workers	and	firms	can	make	bids	and	ask	over	wages	as	much	they	want	to,	but	will	be	constrained	to	make	a	better	bid	or	ask	than	the	best	ask	or	bid	that	will	be	currently	available	at	the	time	they	make	it.	As	a	firm,	you	will	be	asked	to	indicate	the	wage	level	you	are	willing	to	bid	at	a	given	time	
for	each	possible	slot,	from	1	to	11,	in	points.	You	can	validate	these	bids	(let	call	it	“wage	
bids”)	by	clicking	on	OK.	You	can	also	change	your	offers	and	validate	it	by	clicking	on	OK	at	any	time	during	these	10’.	The	pieces	of	information	that	you	will	have	on	your	computer	screen	are	the	following	- A	table	where	you	can	bid	for	wage	for	each	possible	location	slot,	- A	table	where	you	see	the	best	bids	and	asks	that	have	been	made	for	the	moment	by	all	workers	and	all	firms,	such	for	each	possible	slot,	- A	table	that	indicates	which	agreements	have	been	reached	between	a	given	firm	and	 a	 given	 worker,	 that	 is	 the	 wage	 level	 and	 the	 location	 slot	 for	 firm	(workplace).		Your	computer	screen	will	also	give	you	the	opportunity	to	make	offers	by	using	a	table	that	resembles	to	the	following:		
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		Of	course,	you	can	enter	a	zero	value	if	you	wish.	But	you	have	to	realize	that	you	have	very	few	chances	to	get	an	employee	in	this	case.	Moreover,	let	recall	that	if	you	have	an	employee,	you	will	be	able	to	have	revenue	that	is	18	points.	When	you	will	click	on	“OK”	to	validate	these	choices,	your	offers	are	transmitted	to	the	computer	that	will	display	some	of	them	by	applying	the	following	rule.	If	one	or	more	of	the	bids	you	make	for	each	slot	is	better	than	the	best	already	made	by	other	 firms	 and	 currently	 displayed	 on	 every	 participant’s	 computer,	 all	workers	 and	firms	will	see	it.	That	is,	at	any	time,	you	will	see	on	your	computer	2	important	pieces	of	information:	- the	best	bid	that	has	been	made	for	each	slot	by	the	8	firms,	including	you,	that	is	the	highest	wage	that	had	been	proposed	for	each	slot	by	firms,	- the	best	ask	that	has	been	made	for	each	slot	by	the	8	workers,	that	is	the	lowest	wage	that	had	been	proposed	for	each	slot	by	workers		As	a	firm,	you	can	hire	your	employee	by	using	two	possibilities:	- if	a	wage	that	had	been	proposed	on	a	given	slot	interests	you	as	a	firm,	you	can	click	on	it	and	therefore	accepts	it.	That	is,	bids	and	asks	that	you	see	consist	in	
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proposals	that	have	not	been	already	accepted.	In	this	case,	the	computer	will	tell	you	that	the	first	step	ended.		 - you	can	make	a	proposal	by	bidding	on	wage	for	each	slot,	with	the	following	rule:	Your	offer	should	be	higher	than	the	current	best	offer	by	other	firms,	displayed	in	the	table.	If	one	of	your	offers	is	to	be	accepted	by	a	given	worker	(he	should	click	on	it),	the	computer	will	tell	you	that	the	first	step	is	finished	since	you	have	found	a	worker.		In	all	of	 these	2	cases,	 the	computer	will	 tell	you	which	employee	you	get	and	at	what	wage.	Note	that	this	wage	contract	will	also	define	your	location	place	as	a	firm	that	
is	the	workplace	for	your	employee.	That	is,	if	one	worker	accepts	a	bid	you	made	for	a	wage	of	7	points	for	slot	4,	you	will	be	located	in	slot	4	(work	place),	and	the	distance	for	essential	facilities	will	be	of	2	slots	(6-4	=	2).	As	a	firm,	you	can	choose	to	locate	on	any	slot,	but	recall	that	if	a	worker	accepts	one	of	your	wage	bids	on	a	given	slot,	it	will	define	your	location	place.	Moreover,	there	will	be	
only	2	slots	different	 from	slot	6	 that	will	be	available	as	a	possible	 location	 for	
firms	(first-in,	first	served).	But	several	firms	can	choose	the	same	slot	that	already	
had	been	chosen	by	another	firm.	For	instance,	if	firm	1	has	already	a	contract	with	
a	worker	for	slot	2	at	a	given	wage,	and	that	firm	2	has	already	a	contract	with	a	
worker	 for	 slot	 3	 at	 a	 given	 wage,	 firms	 that	 do	 not	 have	 a	 contract	 will	 be	
constrained	to	choose	either	slot	2,	slot	3	or	slot	6	for	having	a	contract	that	defines	
their	location.		As	a	firm,	if	you	get	a	contract	with	a	worker,	you	will	not	be	able	to	make	other	proposals	in	order	to	have	an	employee,	since	you	have	already	one.	Moreover,	your	worker	will	no	longer	be	available	for	other	firms	until	the	current	round	ends.	Then,	after	this	first	step,	as	a	firm,	you	will	have	to	wait	until	the	second	step	ends,	this	step	being	only	for	workers,	in	order	to	be	informed	about	your	payoff.	
Your payoff for the round as a firm 
Your	payoff	in	points	for	the	round	=		
18	-	wage	paid	–	cost	for	accessing	facilities	
Your final payoff as a firm 	At	the	end	of	the	4	rounds	you	made	for	real,	central	computer	will	pick	randomly	for	each	participant	1	round	among	the	4	and	will	pay	it	to	you	for	real	by	transforming	the	points	you	gained	in	Australian	dollars.	Your	total	payoff	will	be	this	sum	plus	a	participation	fee	of	10	AU$.	
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Specific instructions for workers’ type 	As	a	worker,	you	will	have	to	find	a	job	and	a	living	place	(home).	To	find	a	job,	you	will	participate	to	a	job	market	where	8	firms	interact	with	8	workers,	including	you.	Then,	finding	a	job	will	give	you	revenue	and	also	a	wage	that	you	will	use	to	find	a	home.	If	you	do	not	find	a	job,	you	will	get	an	amount	of	20	points	for	the	entire	round.	If	you	find	a	job	and	a	home,	your	final	revenue	in	points	will	depend	on	the	wage	you	have	and	on	the	price	you	paid	for	having	your	home.	The	round	will	consist	in	2	steps,	and	for	each	you	will	interact	with	other	participants.	In	the	first	step,	you	will	interact	with	the	other	workers	and	also	with	the	firms	(that	is	15	other	participants	in	your	group)	in	order	to	find	a	job.	In	the	second	step,	you	will	interact	only	with	other	workers	(that	is	7	participants)	in	order	to	find	a	home.	Firms	only	participate	to	the	first	step	(the	job	market),	since	the	second	step	is	only	a	concern	 for	workers	(the	land	market).	Workers	will	also	participate	 in	the	 first	step	since	they	will	be	able	to	make	proposals	regarding	the	wages	they	ask	for.	
The first step: Finding a Job The	first	step	will	be	organized	in	the	following	way.	As	a	worker,	the	fact	to	get	a	job	will	give	you	revenue,	this	revenue	being	not	the	wage.	This	 revenue	 that	 you	will	 get	 if	 you	 have	 a	 job	 is	 of	 72	 points	 (20	 if	 you	 have	 not).	Moreover,	if	you	get	a	job,	you	will	have	a	wage	that	is	paid	by	a	firm.	That	is,	your	total	income	for	the	round	will	be	the	sum	of	your	revenue	(72	points)	plus	your	wage.		In	this	first	step,	labour	market	will	open	for	10’.	During	this	time,	workers	and	firms	can	make	bids	and	ask	over	wages	as	much	they	want	to,	but	will	be	constrained	to	make	a	better	bid	or	ask	than	the	best	ask	or	bid	that	will	be	currently	available	at	the	time	they	make	it.	As	a	worker,	you	will	be	asked	to	indicate	the	wage	level	you	are	willing	to	ask	at	a	given	time	 for	 each	possible	 slot,	 from	1	 to	 11,	 in	 points.	 You	 can	 validate	 these	 offers	 by	clicking	on	OK.	You	can	also	change	your	asks	(let	call	it	“wage	asks”)	and	validate	it	by	clicking	on	OK	at	any	time	during	these	10’.	The	pieces	of	information	that	you	will	have	on	your	computer	screen	are	the	following:	- A	table	where	you	can	bid	for	wage	for	each	possible	location	slot,	- A	table	where	you	see	the	best	bids	and	asks	that	have	been	made	for	the	moment	by	all	workers	and	all	firms,	for	each	possible	slot,	- A	table	that	indicates	which	agreements	have	been	reached,	that	is	the	wage	level	and	the	location	slot	for	firm	for	each	contract	(see	screen	capture	1).		
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Your	computer	screen	will	also	give	you	the	opportunity	to	make	offers	by	using	a	table	that	resembles	to	the	following:	
		Of	course,	you	can	enter	a	zero	value	if	you	wish.	But	you	have	to	realize	that	in	this	case,	you	will	get	no	additional	points	on	your	income.	When	you	will	click	on	“OK”	to	validate	these	choices,	your	wage	asks	will	be	transmitted	to	the	computer	that	will	display	some	of	them	by	applying	the	following	rule.	If	one	or	more	of	the	bid	asks	you	make	for	every	slot	is	lower	than	the	lowest	already	made	 by	 other	 workers	 and	 currently	 displayed	 on	 every	 participant’s	 computer,	 all	workers	and	firms	will	see	it.	That	is,	at	any	time,	you	will	see	on	your	computer	2	important	pieces	of	information:	- the	best	wage	bid	that	has	been	made	for	each	slot	by	the	8	firms,	that	is	the	highest	wage	that	had	been	proposed	for	each	slot	by	firms,	- the	best	wage	ask	that	has	been	made	for	each	slot	by	the	8	workers	(including	you),	that	is	the	lowest	wage	that	had	been	proposed	for	each	slot	by	workers.		As	a	worker,	you	can	become	firm’s	employee	by	using	2	possibilities:	- if	a	wage	bid	that	had	been	proposed	on	a	given	slot	interests	you	as	a	worker,	you	can	click	on	it	and	therefore	accept	it.	That	is,	bids	and	asks	that	you	see	consist	in	
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proposals	that	have	not	been	already	accepted.	In	this	case,	the	computer	will	tell	you	that	the	first	step	ended,	and	will	indicate	your	payoff	for	the	current	round.	- you	can	make	a	proposal	by	bidding	on	wage	for	each	slot,	with	the	following	rule:	Your	ask(s)	should	be	lower	than	the	current	lowest	wage	ask	by	all	workers	for	each	slot,	that	are	displayed	in	the	table.	If	one	of	your	asks	is	accepted	by	a	given	firm	(she	should	click	on	it),	the	computer	will	tell	you	that	the	first	step	ended,	and	will	indicate	your	total	income	for	this	first	step.		
When	you	will	make	these	wage	asks	in	order	to	find	a	job,	please	consider	that,	
depending	on	your	 final	workplace,	 you	will	be	 charged	 for	 transport	 costs	 that	
depends	 on	 the	 distance	 between	 your	 workplace	 and	 your	 home	 (please	 read	
carefully	the	second	step	below).	In	all	of	these	2	cases,	the	computer	will	tell	you	which	firm	you	get	as	an	employer		and	the	corresponding	wage.	This	wage	contract	will	also	define	location	place	for	this	firm	that	is	your	workplace	as	an	employee.	In	this	case,	as	an	employee,	you	will	not	be	able	to	make	other	proposals	in	order	to	have	another	job,	since	you	have	already	one.	Moreover,	your	employer	will	no	longer	be	able	to	recruit	another	employee,	since	he	has	already	one,	until	the	current	round	ends.	Then,	after	this	first	step,	as	a	worker,	your	income	will	have	2	possible	values.	
• If	you	get	a	job,	your	income	is	72	points	(plus)	your	wage,	and	you	will	be	allowed	to	participate	to	the	second	step.	
• If	 you	 do	 not	 get	 a	 job,	 your	 income	 is	 20	 points,	 and	 you	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	participate	to	the	second	step,		
The second step: Finding a Home As	a	worker,	you	will	have	also	expenses	that	are	related	first	to	the	distance	you	will	have	between	your	home	 location	and	your	workplace	(transport	cost),	and	second,	 to	 the	
land	rent	you	will	have	to	give	to	obtain	a	given	slot	as	a	home.	This	second	step	will	last	at	most	5’.	
The	transport	cost	between	your	home	and	your	workplace	There	are	11	possible	slots	that	could	be	chosen	as	your	home,	and	each	worker	consumes	one	slot	and	no	more.	That	is,	if	a	worker	buys	slot	3,	it	belongs	unavailable	for	all	other	workers	as	a	home	(see	the	graph	below).		 	
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As	an	employee,	you	will	have	to	commute	to	your	workplace	that	is	the	slot	that	had	been	chosen	by	firm	as	a	location	in	step	1.	If	your	home	location	is	the	same	as	your	workplace,	there	will	not	be	any	transport	cost	for	you.	Otherwise,	the	transport	cost	will	be	computed	in	the	following	way:	
Transport	Cost	=	(distance	from	workplace	to	home)	times	9	points	For	instance,	if	your	home	location	is	slot	4,	and	your	workplace	is	on	slot	6,	the	transport	distance	is	2	(that	 is,	6-4),	and	you	will	pay	as	a	worker	a	transport	cost	of	2	X	9	=	18	points.	If	you	locate	in	slot	4	for	instance,	and	workplace	is	on	slot	2,	the	distance	is	also	of	2	slots	(4-2),	and	then	the	cost	will	be	also	18	points	(that	is	2	X	9	points).	This	cost	will	be	subtracted	from	your	total	income.		
How	will	you	find	a	home?	There	are	11	possible	homes	or	slots,	from	slot	1	to	slot	11.	As	you	are	8	workers,	there	are	enough	slots	 for	each	of	you.	The	computer	screen	will	always	recall	 the	 following	pieces	of	information:	- what	is	your	identity	as	a	worker,	- which	firm	is	your	employer	and	at	which	slot	is	your	workplace,	what	is	your	income	(that	is	72	points	+	your	wage).		The	slots	or	homes	will	be	auctioned	by	using	the	following	procedure.	Each	worker	will	have	to	put	bids	for	every	slot,	from	1	to	11	that	is	a	certain	number	of	points	he	will	have	to	pay	in	case	he	obtains	a	given	slot.	Each	worker	through	his	computer	will	submit	these	bids	(from	0	to	a	max	of	140),	in	a	table	that	resembles	to	the	following:			
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	When	you	will	click	on	“OK”	to	validate	these	choices,	your	bids	are	transmitted	to	the	central	computer	and	will	not	be	known	by	the	other	workers,	that	will	similarly	have	to	transmit	bids	to	central	computer.	You	will	not	know	the	bids	that	other	workers	are	to	make.	When	all	workers	have	transmitted	their	bids,	or	as	the	5’	period	ends,	slots	will	be	given	to	workers	by	applying	the	following	rule:	
The	highest	bidder	on	a	given	slot	will	win	the	slot	for	which	he	is	the	highest	bidder,	
but	will	pay	the	second	highest	bid.	For	instance,	assume	that	you	are	the	highest	bidder	on	slot	3,	your	bid	being	10	points	as	the	highest	bid,	as	the	second	highest	bid	for	this	slot	being	7	points	by	another	worker.	Then,	you	will	win	the	home	located	at	slot	3	and	pay	7	points	for	his	home.	The	other	workers	won’t	win	slot	3	since	you	won	it.	In	case	of	equal	bids	among	workers	for	a	given	slot,	the	following	rule	will	be	applied	in	order	to	determine	the	winner	for	each	slot:	- if	bids	are	equal,	 computer	will	attribute	slots	by	giving	priority	 to	workers	 for	which	workplace	are	close	to.	Winner	will	have	also	to	pay	the	second	highest	bid	for	the	slot	he	wins,	- if	bids	are	equal,	and	distance	between	workplaces	are	the	same	for	the	winning	bidders,	computer	will	randomly	pick	one	of	the	winning	bidders,	and	the	winning	bidder	will	pay	the	second	highest	bid,	
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	Of	course,	the	price	you	paid	for	slot	will	be	subtracted	from	your	income.	Last	but	not	least,	computer	will	make	the	difference	between	your	home	location	and	your	workplace	(distance),	and	will	subtract	your	transport	cost	from	your	total	income.	When	slots	will	be	allocated	among	the	workers,	you	will	get	your	payoff	for	the	round,	displayed	 on	 your	 computer	 screen.	 Then	 the	 round	 ends,	 and	 another	 round	 begins.	There	will	be	4	rounds,	after	one	first	round	as	a	trial.	
Your payoff for the round as a worker 	
Your	payoff	in	points	for	the	round	=		
(72	+	your	wage)		
–	(Home	price	you	paid)	–	(your	Transport	Cost)		
Your final payoff as a worker At	the	end	of	the	4	rounds	you	made	for	real,	central	computer	will	pick	randomly	for	each	participant	1	round	among	the	4	and	will	pay	it	to	you	for	real	by	exchanging	the	points	you	gained	in	Australian	dollars.	Your	total	payoff	will	be	this	sum	plus	a	participation	fee	of	10	AU$.		 	
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8. Appendix B: Experimental calibration of preferences for 
workers and firms In	this	appendix,	we	describe	how	we	induce	particular	preferences	for	participants	as	workers	or	participants	as	firms	within	the	laboratory	by	assuming	specific	production	technologies	a	In	order	to	focus	on	land	rents	and	city	structure,	the	experimental	design	excludes	the	equilibrium	process	for	production	of	the	homogenous	good.		This	means	that	firms	do	not	have	to	choose	a	quantity	or	a	price	and	consumers-workers	do	not	have	to	propose	price.	It	is	assumed	that	when	firms	and	consumers	have	reached	equilibrium	both	for	the	labour	market	and	the	land	market,	they	obtain	a	payoff	that	corresponds	respectively	to	the	Nash	equilibrium	profit	or	to	a	net	income	that	corresponds	to	the	optimal	level	of	utility.	Competition	between	firms	is	a	Cournot-Nash	one	(see	Thisse,	2010	for	justification	of	this),	which	ensures	positive	profit	at	equilibrium12.	But	as	 revenue	comes	 from	using	both	facilities	and	one	worker	(no	more	no	less),	firms	are	incentivised	to	offer	wages	that	are	close	to	the	revenue	level,	since	in	the	experiment,	a	firm	that	does	not	succeed	to	hire	a	worker	gains	0	points.	Moreover,	to	ensure	that	competition	among	firms	for	workers	is	sufficiently	strong,	we	give	to	workers	a	positive	endowment	(which	corresponds	to	the	initial	quantity	of	the	numéraire	in	the	theoretical	model)	if	not	recruited	by	any	firm.		The	 utility	 for	 workers	 is	 a	 quadratic	 sub-utility.	 Workers’	 payoff	 is	 the	 difference	between	the	utility	they	get,	given	a	predetermined	level	of	consumption	for	non-spatial	goods	less	urban	costs	(i.e.,	commuting	cost	and	land	rent)	if	they	succeed	to	locate.		If	they	do	not	succeed	in	gaining	a	job,	an	initial	level	of	a	numéraire	is	their	payoff.	
8.1. Preference for Firms To	avoid	the	assumption	that	goods	are	differentiated,	which	is	usual	in	NEG	models,	but	not	essential	to	obtain	its	results,	firms	are	assumed	compete	à	la	Cournot	(oligopolistic	competition	 on	 quantities).	 In	 the	 subsequent	 paragraphs,	 L	 describes	 the	 number	 of	consumers	and	n	the	number	of	firms.	Therefore,	each	firm	i	choose	qi	such	as	to	maximize	profit,	which	is		 𝜋^ = 𝑝𝑞^ − 𝑤 = c𝑎 − 1𝐿f𝑞^^ g 𝑞^ − 𝑤	 (15)	
	
12 	As	 Thisse	 (2010)	 explains	 “Standard	 models	 of	 economic	 geography	 assume	 that	 the	 M-good	 is	
differentiated.	Contrary	to	general	beliefs,	this	assumption	is	not	necessary.	What	we	need	is	the	existence	of	a	
positive	difference	between	the	market	price	and	the	social	marginal	cost”.	
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	This	is	equivalent	to		 𝜋^ = h𝑎 − 1𝐿f𝑞iij^ − 1𝐿 𝑞^k 𝑞^ − 𝑤 = 𝑎𝑞^ − 1𝐿f𝑞i𝑞^ij^ − 1𝐿 𝑞3^ − 𝑤	 (16)		F.O.C.	implies	that	lmnlon = 0,	which	can	be	rewritten	as	equation	(17).		 𝜕𝜋^𝜕𝑞^ = 𝑎 − 1𝐿f𝑞iij^ − 1𝐿 2𝑞^ = 0	 (17)		As	at	Cournot-Nash	equlibrium	qi=q	for	all	firm	i,	we	can	write	that	∑ 𝑞iij^ = (𝑛 − 1)𝑞	Then	F.O.C.	becomes:	 𝜕𝜋^𝜕𝑞^ = 𝑎—1𝐿 (𝑛 − 1)𝑞 − 1𝐿 2𝑞 = 0	↔ (𝑛𝑞 + 𝑞) = 𝐿	Nash-Cournot	quantity	is	therefore		 𝑞∗ = 𝑎𝐿𝑛 + 1	 (18)			 𝑄∗ = 𝑛𝑎𝐿𝑛 + 1	 (19)			 𝑝∗ = 𝑎𝑛 + 1	 (20)		Total	revenue	I	for	each	firm	at	market	equilibrium	is			 𝐼∗ = v 𝑎𝑛 + 1w3 𝐿 = 𝑎3𝐿(𝑛 + 1)3	 (21)		
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As	 in	 the	 experiment,	 n=8	 (see	 below),	 firms	 each	 get	 a	 revenue	 of	 18	 points,	 the	equilibrium	 price	 is	p*=1.5	 for	 q*=12,	 this	 revenue	 being	 used	 for	wage	 expense	 and	communication	costs	between	x=0	and	their	current	location.	
8.2. Preferences for workers The	quadratic	sub-utility	function	is	used	as	a	starting	point	(used	for	instance	by	Thisse	(2010)	or	Gaigné	et	al.	(2012))	as	shown	in	equation	(12).		 𝑈 = v𝑎 − 𝑞2w 𝑞 + 𝑞:	 (12)	
a	is	a	positive	parameter,	q	is	the	consumption	for	a	homogenous	good	and	q0	the	quantity	of	the	numéraire	to	be	consumed,	assumed	to	be	positive	at	equilibrium,	i.e.,	implying	that	the	initial	endowment	of	numéraire	is	large	enough13.	The	Budget	Constraint	is			 𝑞𝑝 + 𝑞: + 𝑅(𝑥) + 𝑡𝑥 = 𝑤 + 𝑞:	 (13)	If	workers	maximize	utility	under	that	constraint,	then	the	(total)	inverse	demand	for	the	manufactured	good	is	given	as	equation	(14)		 𝑝 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 z𝑎 − 𝑄𝐿 , 0{	 (14)	Where	Q=Lq,	L	being	the	total	number	of	workers	that	live	and	consume	in	the	city.	Therefore,	at	equilibrium,	given	the	price	level,	each	worker	consumes	𝑞 = |;;}-.	For	experiment	calibration,	it	is	assumed	that	a=13.5,	that	is	consumption	for	a	good	will	be	 of	 12	 units,	 and	 as	 we	 fix	 the	 ex-post	 consumption	 of	 the	 numéraire	 to	 1,	 such	 a	consumption	pattern	gives	to	each	worker	a	utility	of	91	(points).	Moreover,	the	exchange	rate	 for	experimental	point	 could	be	 (at	 least)	1	euro	 for	10	points,	or	1.5	AU$	 for	10	points.	As	a	consequence,	each	worker	that	consumes	receives	91	points	plus	their	salary,	and	then	the	consumption	value	for	q	and	q0	is	deducted.	As,	at	equilibrium,	the	number	of	units	 to	 be	 consumed	 for	q	 is	 12	 and	 the	 equilibrium	price	 is	p*=1.5	 (see	 below),	 the	consumption	 value	 for	 the	 homogenous	 good	 is	 18.	 As	 the	 ex-post	 quantity	 of	 the	numéraire	to	1	is	fixed,	the	net	utility	is	72	points	(91	–	(18+1)).	A	worker	has	to	add	his	wage,	and	his	budget	is	consequently	net	utility	plus	wage	for	urban	expenses,	i.e.,	land	rent	plus	commuting	cost	which	is	R(x)	+	tx	=	Un	+	w.	
	
13	This	characterization	of	individual	utility	corresponds	to	Ottaviano,	Tabuchi	and	Thisse	(2002)	equation	(2)	with	the	following	calibration:	alpha	=	1;	Beta	=	1;	gamma	=	0	and	x	=	1	(x	is	here	not	the	distance	from	CBD,	but	the	number	of	varieties	for	good).	
